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THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ITS EXTENSION TO
ALL CLASSES OF ACTIONS
Louis C. RiTTER

AND EVERT

H. MAGNUSON

M

UCH criticism is directed against the courts for the long delays
in the administration of justice. Particularly is this true in the
large metropolitan centers where the court calendars are so crowded
that frequently it takes from two to four years before the trial of a
case. This dissatisfaction, both in and out of the legal profession, with
the law's delay has long been manifested. Criticism is directed not so
much against the substantive law as against what is called the business
of the courts, their organization and procedure, their method of handling litigation, the expense involved, and the delay, often the unconscionable delay, in disposing of pending cases:'
To remedy these long delays and to alleviate the criticisms against
the courts and their procedure, the summary judgment procedure was
introduced. This procedure has become an important feature in our
modern practice of law. Its benefits are numerous. It does more than
to prevent delays and secure speedy justice. It aids in the prompt disposition of bona fide issues of law as well as of sham defenses. It
causes the whole judicial process to function more speedily and with
less complexity. It tends to discourage litigation and the interposition
of sham defenses, to effectuate settlements, to expedite judgments, to
simplify court procedure and to lessen court congestion-in short, it
has contributed to the cause of speedy justice and has alleviated the
2
economic waste of unnecessary and protracted litigation.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court realized the possibilities of the motion for summary judgment in remedying the long delays in the court
calendar. In Sullivan v. State it said that the purpose of providing
for summary judgments was to avoid delay and to cut down the frequent contributions to injustice which proceeded from technicalities of
pleading and practice.3 Other courts have also indicated that the motion
for summary judgment was to stamp out the practice of delaying judgment by the interposition of defenses which could not be substantiated
by evidence. 4
I Shientag, Summary Judgments in the Supreme Court of New York (1932)
32 COL. L. REv. 825.
2 Clark and Samenow, The Summary Judgment (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 423; Saxe,
Swnmnzary Judgment in New York, A Statistical Study (1933) 19 CoRN. L. Q.
237.
-213 Wis. 185, 195, 251 N.W. 251 (1933).
4 McAnsh v. Blauner, 222 App. Div. 381, 226 N.Y. Supp. 379 (1928).
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The purpose of this article is to show the effect of the summary
judgment in relieving the courts from undue criticisms by the long
delays in the trial of cases, the development of the summary judgment,
its procedure and application, with special stress being laid on Wisconsin law and procedure, criticisms directed against the motion for summary judgment, and the advisability and possibility of extending it
to all actions, regardless of type, equally on behalf of defendants and
plaintiffs.
DEVELOPMENT AND EXTENT OF USE OF THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The summary judgment provision was introduced into England in
1855. It was restricted at that time to actions on bills and notes. Its
objective was to expedite court procedure. Thus it insured litigants'
economy in obtaining a judgment where the circumstances of the case
lent themselves to a shortened procedure. The preamble to the Summary Procedure on Bills of Exchange Act of 1855 clearly sets forth
the objects and purposes of the summary judgment, stating as follows :5 "Whereas bona fide holders of dishonored Bills of Exchange

and Promissory Notes are often unjustly delayed and put to unnecessary Expense in recovering the Amount thereof by reason of frivolous
and fictitious Defenses to Actions thereon, and it is expedient that
greater facilities than now exist should be given for the Recovery of
Money due on such Bills and Notes..."
By the Judicature Act of 1873 the scope of the summary judgment
was increased, embracing additional classes of cases." A plaintiff could
make the motion in actions on contract, express or implied, where
there was a liquidated demand for money. This included bills of exchange, promissory notes, negotiable and non-negotiable, and other
simple contract debts. By decision this also included "common law"
assumpsit actions for labor and services performed7 and for goods sold
and delivered" and other actions of a like nature. These latter actions
were not necessarily for a definite and certain sum of money; it was
sufficient if the plaintiff state a cause of action and produce an affidavit
upon the hearing of the motion setting forth the basis for the asserted
liability of the defendant. A plaintiff could also make the motion in
actions on a bond or contract under seal for the payment of a liquidated
amount in money. Likewise a plaintiff could make the motion in an
action on a statute where the sum sought to be recovered was a fixed
5

THE SUMMARY PROCEDURE ON BILLS OF EXCHANGE

(1855).

Acr, 18 & 19 VIcr. c. 67

6Annual Practice, Order III, Rule 6, Order XIV, Rule 1.
7Lagos v. Grunwoldt, [1910] K.B. 41; Stephenson v. Weir, L. R. 4 Ir. 369

(1879).

8 M'Cawley Co. v. Campbell, L. R. 4 Ir. 410 (1879).
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sum or in the nature of a debt other than a penalty, in actions on a
guaranty, whether under a seal or not, where the claim against the
principal was in respect of a debt or liquidated demand only, and in
actions involving a trust where the plaintiff sought to recover only a
debt or liquidated demand in money, payable by the defendant, with or
without interest. Thereafter a section which did not appear among the
Rules of 1873 was added. This section permitted plaintiffs to make the
motion for summary judgment in actions between landlords and tenants for the recovery of land where the tenancy was determinable
under the terms of a contract.9 However, the courts in England have
refused to grant motions for summary judgment under this class of
cases where there is any dispute as to the title to the land or where
there are any complicated questions as to the relations of the parties.
The actions under the laws of England within the scope of the
summary judgment procedure are actions for the recovery of debts
or liquidated demands in money, and actions between landlords and
tenants with respect to repossession. There are some jurisdictions in
the United States in which the summary judgment procedure is more
extensively used than in England where it was first introduced.'0 The
adoption and use of the summary judgment in New York is especially
interesting to attorneys in Wisconsin because not only has Wisconsin
originally adopted the summary judgment rule from New York, but
also the Wisconsin Supreme Court has said that it accepts and adopts
the interpretation of the New York statute given by the New York
courts.7 Prior to the adoption of the summary judgment rule in New
York, a defendant who wished to delay trial and prevent a judgment
for which he had no bona fide defense could interpose a general denial
in his answer. This general denial frequently was a sham defense, but
the court was powerless to strike it.'2 As a result a movement was
started in New York to do away with these sham defenses and thus
avoid the long delays which were becoming prevalent in the New York
courts.
When an investigation for a method to speed up the court calendars
was made, it was discovered that a great many sham pleas were being
interposed. Upon further inquiry, it was discovered that the procedure
of the summary judgment which had been used extensively in England
since 1855 and less extensively in New Jersey since 1873 had been
exceedingly instrumental in reducing the number of these pleas. Because of its great possibilities in eliminating the evils aforementioned,
9Keating v. Mulcaly, [1926] Ir. R. 214.

1 See Clark and Samenow, The Summary Judgment (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 423.

"1Jefferson Gardens Inc. v. Terzan, 216 Wis. 230, 257 N.W. 154 (1934).
Cf. Wayland v. Tysen, 45 N.Y. 281 (1871) ; Farmers' National Bank v. Leland,
50 N.Y. 673 (1872); and Neuberger v. Wild, 24 Hun. 347 (N.Y. 1881).

12

THE MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21

the summary judgment procedure was adopted and became effective in
October, 1921.1'
The New York procedure in regard to the summary judgment was
of much narrower compass than that adopted in England and in several
states in the United States. In New York, at first, it was limited to
actions on contracts, express or implied, and to actions on a judgment
for a stated sum where there was a definite and absolute debt or liquidated demand.' 4 As compared with the English rule, it could not be
applied to actions on statutes where the sum sought to be recovered
was a fixed sum or in the nature of a debt other than a penalty, 15 or
to actions for the recovery of land,' or to suits on trusts.' 7 The New
York courts have also refused to permit its use in a suit for an injunction.' 8 It was held by the New York court that one could move for
summary judgment in a case involving liquidated damages and on a
contract, but not in a case to foreclose a mortgage' 9
20
The New York courts did express approval of the general scheme
and on April 16, 1932, the scope of the motion for summary judgment
was extended by an amendment adopted by the joint order of the
presiding justices of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in
the four judicial departments. The amended rule2 not only permitted
the motion for summary judgment to be made in an action to recover
a debt or liquidated demand arising on a contract, express or implied,
or on a judgment for a stated sum, but also permitted the motion to be
made in an action on a statute where the sum sought to be recovered is
a sum of money other than a penalty; it likewise permitted the motion
to be made in actions to recover an unliquidated debt or demand for
a sum of money only arising on a contract, express or implied, other
than for breech of promise to marry, in actions to recover possession
of specific chattels, with or without claim for the hire thereof, or for
damages for the taking or detention thereof, in actions to enforce or
foreclose liens or mortgages in actions for the specific performance of
a contract in writing for the sale or purchase of property, and in actions
for an accounting arising on a written contract. This recent change and
the recent decisions of the court indicate a decided tendency to extend
the motion for summary judgment to other classes of cases. Of course,
as may well be expected, a remedy newly adopted, will not gain mo'

Y. CIVIL PRACTICE RULES,
Op. cit. supra, note 13.

3N.

14

Rule 113 and Rule 114 (1921).

Cf. Annual Practice, Order III, Rule 6, Order XIV, Rule 1.
Op. cit. supra, note 15.
17 Op. cit. supra, note 15.
is Op. cit. supra, note 15.
19 Toner v. Ehrgott, 226 App. Div. 244, 235 N.Y. Supp. 17 (1929).
'o Saunders v. Delario, 135 Misc. Rep. 455, 238 N.Y. Supp. 337 (1930).
21 Cahill, N. Y. CIVIL PRACTICE ACT, Rule 113 (1932).
12
's
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mentum until the legal profession has become acquainted with it, its
objects and its effects. It is suggested that the courts and the lawyers
are not sufficiently acquainted with the summary judgment so that
the time is ripe for extending it to other classes of actions not mentioned in this recent statute of New York.
Until the extension of the summary judgment in New York in 1932,
Connecticut had used the most comprehensive and extensive summary
judgment scheme known in the United States. It was adopted by order
of the judges of the Superior Court to be effective in February, 1929.
Whereas in New York by 1921 motions for summary judgments
could be made only in actions on contracts and actions on judgments,
in Connecticut such motions could be made also in actions on negotiable
instruments, actions on statutes, actions on guaranties, actions for the
recovery of specific chattels, actions to quiet title, actions to enforce
or foreclose liens or mortgages and any action to discharge an invalid
mortgage, lien caveat or lis pendens. 22 It is interesting to note, that in
1932, New York followed Connecticut. The procedure was allowed in
actions for specific performance of written contracts for the sale or
purchase of property and in actions for an accounting arising on a
written contract.23 The history of its adoption along with the favorable
judicial attitude toward the rule augurs well for its future.
Illinois, the most recent state to adopt a code of civil procedure,
has had a long and uninterrupted experience with the summary judgment procedure. Cook County has enforced the rule since 1853.24 The
rule which provided for default judgments was applicable to nearly
the same class of cases as in the early English procedure. 5 In 1872, behad
cause of "delay in the administration of justice," the rule which
26
been enforced in Cook County was adopted in Illinois generally. Just
prior to the enactment of the code of January 1, 1934, in Illinois, the
motion was limited to actions on contracts, express or implied, for the
payment of money.2 When the code was adopted the remedy as to
summary judgments was extended to other types of actions, comparable to what had been done in New York and Connecticut.
The current provision in the Illinois Code 3 extends the motion for
summary judgment not only to actions on contracts and actions on
judgments, but also to include actions to recover possession of land,
CoNNx. RULES OF CIVIL PRACTICE, § 14A (1) ; see also sections 14A (2),
(3), (4), (5) and (6). See also CONN. GEN. STAT. (1932) Title LVIII, c.
317, §§ 5971-5981.

22 Cf.

23NEW

24

25

YORK CIVIL PRACrICE Acr (Cahill, 1932) Rule 113.

COMIMON LAW PROCEDURE Acr,

Rules under the

jUDICATVRE

1853.

AcT, Order III, Rule 6 (1873).

Laws (1872), c. 332, § 36.
REV. STAT. (Cahill, 1929) c. 110, § 55.
ILL. REV. STAT. (1935) c. 110, § 57.

26ill.

27
2 8 ILL.
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with or without rent or mesne profits and to include actions for the
recovery of chattels. Only the plaintiff in Illinois can make the motion.
But a defendant may employ the summary judgment procedure where
he has filed a counterclaim.29
Many states have adopted the summary judgment procedure. Some states have extended its scope. Others have
held it applicable only to a few special types of actions.
In addition to England, New York, Connecticut and Illinois, the
following states have also adopted the summary judgment, in some
0
9a
form or another: New Jersey, 2 District of Columbia,3 Delaware, 3
Pennsylvania, 32 Indiana,3 3 Virginia,- West Virginia, 35 South Carolina,3 6 Kentucky,37 Alabama,38 Arkansas, 39 Tennessee 4 0° Missouri,4 1
Louisiana4 2 Massachusetts ' 3 Michigan 4 4 Minnesota, 45 Rhode Is4 a
land,4 6 and Wisconsin.
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN WISCONSIN

After a careful and comprehensive study the advisory committee
on rules of pleading, practice and procedure, created by the Wisconsin
legislature in 1929, recommended to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
the adoption of the summary judgment as it existed in New York at
this time.47 As a result the rule was adopted, identical in language with
Rule 113 of the New York Rules of Civil Practice as it existed in 1921.
The only difference between the New York rule of 1921 and the
Wisconsin rule of 1929 is that the New York rule includes the following words, "by the judge hearing the motion," and the Wisconsin rule,
29 ILL. REV. STAT. (1935) c. 110, Rule 16.
29
aNew Jersey was one of the first states to introduce the summary judgment
into the United States. N. J. Laws (1912) c. 223, Schedule A, Sec. 57; N.J.
Laws (1928) c. 151, p. 306; see also 1925-1930 Supp. to N. J. CoMP. STAT.
(1931) §§ 163-291, 163-292.
30 Rules of the Supreme Court of the Dist. of Col., Rule 73, § 1.
31 DEL. REV. CODE (1915) c. 128, § 6.
2 PENN. STAT. (Purdon, 1936) Title VII, §§ 735 and 737.
33 IND. STAT. (Burns, 1933) § 409.
34 VA. CODE (1924) c. 251, § 6046, includes all actions.
35 W. VA. CODE (1931) c. 56, § 6, limited to contracts.
36 S. C. CODE (1932) c. 29, § 587.
37 Ky. STAT. (Carroll, 1927) Title X, c. 5, § 444, applies only to actions by or
against sureties.
38 ALA. CODE (1923) c. 346, art. I-VI.
39 ARK. DIG. STAT. (Crawford & Moses, 1921) c. 102, §§ 6250-6258.
40 TENN. CODE

(Williams, 1934) c. 14, § 2941, arts. 1-7.

41
Mo. STAT. (1932) § 2941, applies only to action by and against sureties.
42
LA. PRAC. CODE (1932, 1936) arts. 97 and 98.
4 ANNo. LAWS, MASS. (1933) Vol. 8, c. 239, § 1.
-

MIcH. COMp. LAws (1929) c. 266, §§ 14260, 14261.

45 MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 909, applicable only to sheriffs.
46 R. I. LAWS (1932) c. 1893.
46a Wis. STAT. (1935) § 270.635.

47 Boesel, The Suxnmary Judgment (1930)

6 Wis. L. REv. 5.
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"by the court hearing the motion." This difference in language makes
it certain that under the Wisconsin procedure the motion must be heard
by the judge in open court whereas in New York there might be the
possibility of the judge hearing the motion in his chambers.
The rule as adopted by Wisconsin in 19294 provides that the answer may be stricken if the action is to recover a debt or liquidated
demand arising on contract, or on judgment for a sum stated, and
judgment may be entered upon the motion and the affidavit of the
plaintiff or someone familiar with the facts. The cause of action, the
amount claimed, and a statement of the belief that that there is no defense must be verified. The defendant may, however, defend upon a
showing by affidavit, or other proof, that he has a bona fide defense.
This statute, being patterned after the New York Rule of 1921, was
of much narrower scope than that adopted in England and in several
of the states in the United States at that time (1929). It was limited
to actions on contracts and actions on judgments for a stated sum
where there is a definite and absolute debt or liquidated demand. The
Wisconsin court has indicated that it looks upon the summary judgment as harsh even in its limited field. 49 Nevertheless the court has also
indicated that it will do as other courts have done-give full consideration to the legislative intent and purpose 50
It is interesting to note that at the time of the adoption of the summary judgment statute, the Wisconsin legislature refused to include
actions under a statute where the sum sought to be recovered was a
fixed sum or in the nature of a debt, or actions on guaranties, sealed
or unsealed, when the claim against the principal was in respect of a
debt or liquidated demand only, or in actions for the recovery of
specific chattels, or in actions to quiet and settle the title to real
estate or any interest therein or in actions to enforce or foreclose a lien or a mortgage, or in actions to discharge any allegedly invalid mortgage, lien or caveat or lis pendens. All of these
had been covered by the Connecticut statute,5 ' and the legislature in
New York followed Connecticut a few years later. In New York it
was also provided that the motion could be made in actions for the
specific performance of a contract in writing for the sale or purchase
of property, including such alternative and incidental relief as the cases
might require, and in suits for accountings arising on written contracts,
52
sealed or unsealed.
48

Wis. STAT. (1931) § 270.635.
49 Sullivan v. State, 213 Wis. 185, 251 N.W. 251 (1933).
50 Jefferson Gardens, Inc. v. Terzan, 216 Wis. 230, 257 N.W. 154.
CONN. RULES OF CivIL PRACrIcE, § 14A (1).
62Naw YORK CIVIL PRACTICE AcT (Cahill, 1932) 540.
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The summary judgment statute has been expanded in Wisconsin.
The statute permits, in part, the entry of summary judgment in an
action to recover on a debt or demand arising on an express or implied
contract other than for breach of promise to marry, or on a judgment
for a sum stated, or on a statute where the sum sought to be recovered
is fixed or in the nature of a debt. Similarly judgment may be entered
to recover possession of specific real or personal property, with or
without claim for damages for the use thereof, also to enforce or foreclose a lien or mortgage, or to enforce specific performance of a written
contract (including alternative and incidental relief), or to compel an
accounting under a written contract. 53 The motion may be made by
either plaintiff or defendant. Thus, the possibility of sham or frivolous denials in the answer is diminished, and likewise the possibility
of plaintiff's going to trial without sufficient proof to overcome the
denials or defenses of the defendant is diminished. Hence the calendars
can be cleared of cases where the plaintiff should not have started
action. The motion for summary judgment is primarily a plaintiff's
remedy. An order denying application for summary judgment is now
appealable.5
The constitutionality of the summary judgment procedure has not
been raised in Wisconsin. It has been contended in New York that this
procedure affected the litigant's right to a trial by jury. 5 But an intermediate appellate court in New York met this contention by pointing
out that the court does not try any issues of fact under this scheme of
procedure but does determine whether there is an issue of fact to be
tried. These observations are pertinent with respect to any of the types
of actions within any of the statutory schemes.
PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS

The word "motion" as used in a motion for summary judgment, is
like any other motion, an application for an order, and may be made
either upon notice of motion or upon order to show cause. However,
there are certain distinctions between the motion for summary judgment and other motions. As between the motion for summary judgment and a motion to strike sham pleas, the latter applies to
all actions, whereas the motion for summary judgment applies
only to those classes of action mentioned in the statute; also in
(1935) § 270.635.
WIs. STAT. (1935) § 274.33 (3) ; Loehr v. Steng, 219 Wis. 361, 263 N.W. 373
(1935).
55 Dwan v. Masserene, 199 App. Div. 872, 192 N.Y. Supp. 577 (1922) ; cf. General
Investment Co. v. Interborough Transit Co., 235 N.Y. 133, 139 N.E. 216 (1923)
and People's Wayne County Bank v. Wolverine Box Co., 250 Mich. 273, 230
N.W. 170 (1930).
53 Wis. STAT.

54
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a motion to strike sham pleadings, the plaintiff must first establish the falsity of the pleading, whereas in a motion for a summary
judgment, the defendant must show that he has a bona fide defense.
In a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the moving party contends
that there is no cause of action, whereas in a motion for summary
judgment, the moving party does not claim that the pleadings do not
raise an issue, but does claim that the adverse party has no evidence to
support his claim or defense. In a motion for judgment on the pleadings, there will be only the answer and the complaint. In a motion for
summary judgment, the moving party must also have affidavits. Further, a "good denial" may be sufficient to prevent a motion for judgment on the pleadings, but a "good denial" may not be sufficient in a
summary case.
The affidavit is the important and distinguishing feature of the summary judgment. The Wisconsin statute in regard thereto 5 provides
that there shall be at least two affidavits accompanying the notice of
motion. First, there shall be the affidavit of the moving party, wherein
he states that he believes that there is no defense to the action, or that
the action has no merit, as the case may be. Evidentiary facts showing a
cause of action must be stated. Secondly, there must be an affidavit by
some person having knowledge of the facts, and containing evidentiary
facts, not ultimate facts or mere conclusions of law.51 In the case of
In re Littleton's Estate5s the court held that the affidavit must set forth
the evidentiary facts with such particularity that the court shall be
satisfied therefrom of the plaintiff's actual right to recover. In Dwan
v. Massarene8 it was said that the plaintiff's affidavit must state "such
facts as are necessary to establish a good cause of action, and that it
will not be sufficient if it verifies only a portion of the cause of action,
leaving out some essential part thereof."
In a Michigan case, La Prise v. Wayne 0° an affidavit in support of
the plaintiff stated "that plaintiffs have a good and meritorious cause
of action against said defendant and that the amount claimed by the
plaintiff is as follows . . ." This affidavit was held to be clearly insuf-

ficient. The plaintiff's affidavit should be strictly construed, and if it is
insufficient to support his cause of action, the motion should be denied,
although the defendant fails to file an opposing affidavit, or to show
any facts sufficiently to entitle him to defend.
Wis. STAT. (1935) § 270.635 (2).
57 Kellogg v. Berkshire Bldg. Corp., 125 Misc. Rep. 818, 211 N.Y. Supp. 623
(1925); Sher v. Rodkin, 198 N.Y. Supp. 597 (1923).
58 129 Misc. Rep. 845, 223 N.Y. Supp. 470 (1927).
51 199 App. Div. 872, 192 N.Y. Supp. 572 (1922).
60 234 Mich. 371, 208 N.W. 449 (1926).
5

- 36 C. J. 205.
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The Wisconsin court has pointed out that the affidavits of plaintiff
must disclose a cause of action. In Sullivan v. State, 2 Justice Wickham
said: "If, however, the real spirit and purpose of the summary judgment law are to be given effect, the search of the record should include
the affidavits in support of the complaint, and where these affidavits
disclose no cause of action, the complaint should be dismissed even
though, without the affidavits and solely upon the pleadings, a demurrer
would have to be overruled as to all or part of it. The purpose of providing for summary judgments is to avoid delay and to cut down the
frequent contributions to injustice which proceed from technicalities
of pleading and practice. It seems quite as important to us that the
plaintiff's cause of action should be summarily dismissed when no cause
of action is shown by the pleading and affidavits, as it is that the defendant's formally sufficient pleadings should be disregarded when the
plaintiff has satisfied the terms of the statute and the defendant has
failed to convince the court that there exists a genuine issue." Moreover, the sufficiency of the affidavits of both parties is to be determined
by rules of evidence. In other words, the affidavits must state facts
which would be admissible in evidence, and must affirmatively show
that the affiant would, if sworn as a witness, be competent to testify
63
to the facts contained in his affidavit.
What has been said heretofore as to the plaintiff is also applicable
to the defendant. In making the motion for summary judgment his affidavit should allege that the action has no merit. He must also state
evidentiary facts showing that his denials are sufficient to defeat the
plaintiff's case. In addition there may be the affidavit of some person
who has knowledge of the facts. This latter affidavit must contain such
evidentiary facts, including documents or copies thereof, as shall show
that the defendant's denials or defenses are sufficient to defeat the
plaintiff's contentions.
Thus the preliminary skirmish resolves itself into a battle of affidavits, in which evidentiary facts are the principal weapons.4 The
motion will be granted or overruled depending upon whether or not
the affidavits disclose an issue. The opposing party must set up a bona
fide defense to the motion, supported by affidavits, in order to bar the
motion ;'5 and failure to present an affidavit of defense to the motion
62213

Wis. 185, 251 N.W. 251 (1933).

63 Schempt v. New Era Life Ass'n., 253 Mich. 152, 234 N.W. 177 (1931).

WIs. STAT. (1935) § 270.635.
65Hongkong Banking Corp. v. Lazard-Godchaux Co., 207 App. Div. 174, 201
N.Y. Supp. 771 (1923), aff'd in 239 N.Y. 610 (1925); Spiegel Realty Co. v.
Gotham Nat. Bk., 121 Misc. Rep. 547, 201 N.Y. Supp. 599 (1923), aff'd in 204
N.Y. Supp. 927 (1924); Cogswell v. Cogswell, 130 Misc. Rep. 541, 224 N.Y.
Supp. 59 (1927); Evalenko v. Colts, 125 Misc. Rep. 726, 210 N.Y. Supp. 35
(1925), aff'd in 213 N.Y. Supp. 796 (1926).
6
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for summary judgment is usually fatal to the opposing party's case.,6
In Jefferson Gardens, Inc. v. Terzanif it was held that where the defendant does not deny the allegations of the affidavits presented by the
plaintiff in support of his motion, the allegation of that affidavit is
taken as true. Despite the intimation, in an early case, 68 the matter has
not been conclusively determined. In all probability, the courts will
tend to limit the number, in order to avoid opportunity for delay.
Remembering, then, that the motion will be denied unless an issue
of fact is presented by the pleadings, cognizance must be taken of the
fact that the court does not decide on the truth of the affidavits, but
takes them as being absolutely true. Nor does it decide on the reputation of the affiants as to truth and veracity, for the purpose of the motion for summary judgment is merely to determine whether or not a
defense worthy of trial exists, or whether the action has sufficient
merit to entitle the plaintiff to go to trial. The test used in determining
the propriety of a summary judgment has been variously stated by the
different courts.
Prior to April 25, 1935, an order denying a motion for summary
judgment was held not be an appealable order because it did not, in
effect, determine the action and prevent a judgment from which an
appeal could be taken, as was required of appealable orders under the
Wisconsin statutes,6 9 even though it may have affected a substantial
right.70 However, after April 25, 1935, by virtue of an amendment to
the Wisconsin statute, an order denying a motion for summary judgment is now an appealable order.71 See also Loehr v. Steng 2 where it
was held that such an order is now appealable.
CRITICISmS ANSWERED

At the time the summary judgment procedure was first proposed
several criticisms other than constitutional objections were directed
against it.-Opponents of the remedy have contended that the motion for
summary judgment presents the means for embarking upon a "fishing
expedition," in other words, that the motion will be used to determine
what evidence the adverse party will present at the trial. The cry is
that in the vast majority of cases the defendant will be able to show,
by hook or crook, some reason or some evidence sufficient to convince
66 Hoof v. Hunter Corp., 193 N.Y. Supp. 91 (1922); Maetz v. Daly, 120 Misc.
Rep. 466, 198 N.Y. Supp. 690 (1923) ; Saunders v. Delario, 135 Misc. Rep. 455,

238 N.Y. Supp. 337 (1930).
230, 257 N.W. 154 (1934).
Twigg, 117 Misc. Rep. 154, 191 N.Y. Supp. 781 (1921).
WIs. STAT. (1935) § 274.33 (1).
70 Schlesinger v. Schroeder, 210 Wis. 403, 245 N.W. 666 (1933).
71 Wis. STAT. (1935) § 274.33 (3).
6 216 Wis.
68
69 Twiff v.

72219

Wis. 361, 263 N.W. 373 (1935).
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the court that there is an issue to be tried. On the other hand, it would
seem to be well worth while for the plaintiff in almost every action
within the classes allowed by statute, to make such a motion upon the
chance that the defendant may not be able to convince the court that
there is an issue to be tried, or, at least, with a view toward obtaining
considerable details with reference to the defendant's defenses, which
of cross-examination
would doubtless be of great value for the purpose
3
at the trial and general preparation for trial.7
In answering this objection it must be remembered that the party
making the motion must state or present evidentiary facts in his affidavit showing that he has a good cause of action or that he has a meritorious defense. In a Wisconsin case, Sullivan v. State,14 Justice
Wickham pointed out that to give effect to the real spirit and purpose
of the summary judgment law the search of the record should include
the affidavits in support of the complaint, and where these affidavits
disclose no cause of action the complaint should be dismissed even
though, without affidavits, and solely upon the pleadings, a demurrer
would have to be overruled as to all or part of it. The New York
Court of Appeals answered the defendant's contention that the plaintiff's affidavits, upon a motion for summary judgment, do not establish
the defendant's default with technical precision by pointing out that the
very object of a motion for summary judgment is to separate what is
formal or pretended in denial from that which is genuine and substantial, so that only the latter may subject a suitor to the burden of a
trial. In short, it has been repeatedly held by the courts that if the
plaintiff's affidavit is insufficient to support his cause of action, the motion should be denied, and this despite the fact that the defendant fails
to file an opposing affidavit, or to show any facts sufficient to entitle
him to defendV'
Hence, it follows, that since the party making the motion must also
state facts, he is showing his hand and evidence as well as exposing
the facts available to the person against whom the motion is directed.
Thus, no undue advantage can be taken of either party. Then, too, this
procedure will result in any event in a clarification of the issue in dispute which should tend to promote an adjustment of the dispute between the parties or a simpler trial of the issues. The speed of the procedure is desirable, but still more to be emphasized is its simplicity and
7

3 MEDINA, PLEADING AND PRACrICE UNDER THE NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE Acr

(1922) pp. 79, 80.
Wis. 185, 251 N.W. 251 (1933).
In re Littleton's Estate, 129 Misc. Rep. 865, 223 N.Y. Supp. 870 (1927)
La Prise v. Wayne, 234 Mich. 371, 208 N.W. 449 (1926); 34 C.J. 205; A. Sidney Davison Coal Co., Inc. v. Interstate Coal Co., 193 N.Y. Supp. 883 (1921) ;
Tidewater Oil Sales Corp. v. Pierce, 213 App. Div. 796, 210 N.Y. Supp. 759
(1925).
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directness in bringing out the real dispute. Like the summons for direction before the masters in chancery in England, the procedure leads
to a discovery of the issues under the direct control of the court and
with the penalty of a final disposition of the case if the issues are not
disclosed. We may all prophesy for it a more important position in
future practice than merely that of a prod for delinquent debtors. It is
apparent, then, that the objection that the motion may be used as a
means to embark upon a "fishing expedition" is groundless. Moreover,
the remedy not only furnishes a simple, easy, and direct way of disposing of litigation in which there is no real cause of action or defense, but
the procedure also aids in bringing out the real dispute and established
justice in its true sense. After all, the trial of an action should not be
a battle of wits, but it should have as its sole aim and purpose the establishment and the furtherance of justice.
Another objection to the summary judgment, occasionally raised, is
that the motion, from a practical viewpoint, has a direct tendency to
lessen the fees of attorneys inasmuch as an attorney is not likely to
recover as large a fee in making the motion as he would if he appeared
in open court and examined and cross-examined witnesses. This argument has strength-and weakness. Its strength lies in the fact that attorneys must earn a living, and as a practical propostion, the use of the
motion does reduce the fee of the attorney. On the other hand, the
motion will enable the lawyer to recover his fee within a much shorter
time, since it eliminates the necessity of waiting from two to four
years before the trial of a "cause" and the final disposition of the case.
The objection that the motion tends to reduce the fee of the attorney
is inherently weak in that the practice of law is a profession and not
a business. As was pointed out in a Massachusetts case, In re Bergeron," the practice of law is not a craft or trade, but is a profession
whose main purpose is to aid in the doing of justice according to law,
between the state and the individual, and between man and man. The
respect for the courts must be upheld, and if an attorney acts contrary
to the ethics of the profession the courts will be lowered in the estimation of the people. In Ellis v. Frawley 7 the court points out that the
attorney who looks only to the fee he is getting soon forgets his high
duties as a minister at the altar of justice, and becomes a mere grubber for money in the muck heaps of the world. Lastly, the attorney
must not forget that although he owes a duty to his client, he also
owes a duty to the court. As stated by Justice Magruder, in People v.
Beatties "The lawyer's duty is of a double character; he owes to his
7,

220 Mdass. 472, 107 N.E. 1007 (1915).

77 165 Wis. 381, 161 N.W. 364 (1917).

78 137 I11. 553, 27 N.E. 1096 (1891).
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client the duty of fidelity, but he also owes the duty of good faith and
honorable dealing to the judicial tribunals before whom he practices
his profession."
The opponents of the remedy further say that it seems to be forgotten that the judicial system is made up not merely of judges and
courts, but also of lawyers, and that the efforts of all are futile, if the
litigants who furnish the causes in litigation are not satisfied that they
have had the benefit of deliberate consideration by a court, which has
heard them and their witnesses, and not merely read the affidavits prepared by their attorneys. A "day in court" has a literal significance
which is the guarantee against loss of confidence in the judicial
process.

9

This objection is not a serious one. From the outset, it must be remembered that the court is not trying the issues when a motion for
summary judgment is made, but rather it merely determines whether
or not a defense worthy of trial exists, or whether the action has any
merit to entitle a plaintiff to a trial, and to dispose of the case summarily only when such defense or meritorious action is lacking.8 0 Further, most of the cases in our courts of general jurisdiction, which
go to judgment, eventually result in judgment for the plaintiff. It results, therefore, that the delay is, for the most part at the expense of
the one who, by the law of probabilities, is the more deserving of the
parties. To the extent that our courts are permitting avoidable delay,
to that extent are they denying justice."' Moreover, litigants have no
vested rights in delays in litigation.
The last objection to the motion for summary judgment, as advanced by many opponents of the remedy, is that it is too revolutionary.
These opponents forget that the remedy has been used with great effectiveness in England since 1855. Moreover, it is necessary that the
court keep pace with the times not only in its application of substantive
law but also in its procedure. In Ex Parte Peterson 2 Mr. Justice
Brandeis lauded the introduction of new devices which were properly
adaptable to the "ancient institution." In Cropley v. Vogelere3 cognizance was taken of the fact the trend in the United States is to cast
aside ancient processes in favor of more modern procedure. Although
it has been truly said that it takes time, and often a long time, to make
9

" ROTHSCHILD, SUMMARY JUDICIAL POWER

(1934) 361, 362.

Dwan v. Massarene, 199 App. Div. 872, 192 N.Y. Supp. 572 (1922); Peoples
Wayne County Bank v. Wolverine Box Co., 250 Mich. 273, 230 N.W. 170;
Edw. F. Dibble, Seedgrower v. Jones, 130 Misc. Rep. 359, 223 N.Y. Supp. 785
(1927); Curry v. Mackenzie, 238 N.Y. 267, 146 N.E. 375 (1935); 60 West
Fifty Third St. Corp. v. Haskell, 231 App. Div. 62, 246 N.Y. Supp. 360 (1930).
81 Clark and Samenow, The Sonmary Judgment (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 423.
82253 U.S. 300, 40 Sup. Ct. 543, 64 L.ed. 919 (1920).
8s 2 D.C. App. 28 (1893).
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a new remedy thoroughly operative, still, as early as January, 1924,
the procedure was recognized in this country as avoiding much unrighteous delay. Since that time the motion for summary judgment in the
United States, as well as in England, has thoroughly demonstrated its
effectiveness in avoiding delays and in establishing justice.
Experience during the last fifteen years in New York, and more
recently in Wisconsin, has indicated that the procedure has generally
accomplished its avowed objective of reducing the delays in litigation,
that it has not given use to the abuses that were once feared. That
the motion, at first, was limited to a few classes of actions, was to be
expected in view of the fact that any change must be gradually developed lest those who are prone to convervatism object too vigorously.
The adoption of the narrower rule was solely due to the desire that at
least an entering wedge for the new procedure should be made. And
there are many indications that the procedure, at least in Wisconsin,
will be extended to all classes of actions. The stimulous of more
crowded dockets will certainly lead to its extension along more liberal
lines. Then, too, the bench and bar have not, as yet, fully appreciated
and utilized its present potentialities. As soon as attorneys become acquainted with its procedure and application, its simplicity, and its
benefits in not only avoiding delays but also in the clarification of issues
which will result in simpler trials, its use will be more general.
It can be readily understood that a sham answer in an action on
a contract is just as false as in an answer in a quasi contract action.
An unreal defense in a suit to enforce or foreclose a mortgage or in a
suit to enforce specific performance of a contract is just as sham as a
defense in a suit for injunction. A false denial in an answer in any one
of the classes of actions mentioned by the statute 6 is just as unreal as
in a tort action. In short, a false denial in an answer is without merit
regardless of the kind of action in which it is interposed. Moreover, the
motion may be used in those cases where there is no dispute as to the
facts, thus avoiding costly jury trial and compelling a person to wait
two or four years, only to have the court direct a verdict. From these
and other cases, where a verdict has been directed, it can be seen that
the delay and the cost of a trial might have been avoided had the court
known that there was no issue to try. Of course, it is not contended
that the court should direct a verdict. This would be carrying the motion too far and would result in the serious abuse of having the court
"try" actions on affidavits without having the opportunity of seeing the
84

Saxe, Sum'mary Judgment in New York, A Statistical Study (1933) 19 CoRN.
L. Q. 237.

" Shientag, Summary Judgments in the Supreme Court of New York (1932)

32 CoL. L. REv. 824, 856.
STAT. (1935) § 270.635.
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witnesses, their demeanor on the stand, and without being given the assistance of counsel in determining the reputation of the witnesses for
truth and veracity. Nor is it contended that the use of the motion could
not be subjected to any abuse at all. However, under the surveillance
of the court its abuses can be limited to a small number. Under the
present system of regulating practice and procedure in Wisconsin, the
extension and enlargement of the scope of the rule can be readily made
by the supreme court, without the difficulties and delays of legislative
enactment8 7
APPENDIX*
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

CIRCUIT COURT

MILWAUKEE COUNTY

STATE OF WISCONSIN

John Doe,
Plaintiff.
vs.
Richard Roe,
Defendant.

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

T o : ---------------------------------Attorney for Defendant
Upon the attached affidavits of --------------and
, attorney for the plaintiff;
and on motion of --------------------IT IS ORDERED, that the defendant, Richard Roe, show cause before the
court in the branch thereof presided over by Hon.........................
at the court house in the City of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, on the--------- day
of------------------, 10_.... , at ------ o'clock, A.M., or as soon thereafter as counsel can be heard, why the answer of said defendant heretofore
filed in this action should not be stricken from the records in this action and
judgment entered for the plaintiff and against the defendant, Richard Roe, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule, Sec. 270.635, in the sum ofDollars ($-------------) with interest according to the demand of the
complaint.
IT IS ORDERED FURTHER that a copy of this order be served upon
, 19
the attorney for the defendant on or before --------------------Dated:Circuit Judge.
s7 Boesel, The Sumnmary Judgment (1930) 6 Wis. L. REv. 5.
* The following forms should be used by the plaintiff in making the motion
for summary judgment. The forms used by a defendant in making the
motion for summary judgment are much the same as those used by the plaintiff except that the defendant must state that he believes that the action has
no merit. However, the defendant, in making the motion, must by affidavit
show that his denials or defenses are sufficient to defeat the plaintiff. Otherwise, the forms are alike, the plaintiff making an affidavit to the effect that
he has a good and meritorious cause of action, and supported by affidavits of
the evidentiary facts showing that he has such a meritorious action.

1936]

THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
NOTICE OF MOTION'

CIRCUIT COURT

MILWAUKEE COUNTY

STATE OF WISCONSIN

John Doe,

Plaintiff.
vs.
Richard Roe,
Defendant.

NOTICE OF MOTION2

To .........
.
Attorney for Defendant.
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on the ----day of
. 19_, at the opening of court on said day or as soon thereafter as counsel can be heard, and at
the court room of the court above named in the courthouse of the City of
Milwaukee, Wisconsin, the undersigned, as attorney for the plaintiff in the above
entitled action, will move said court to strike from the records in this action,
defendant's answer and for summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendant, Richard Roe, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule, Sec.
270.635, in the principal sum of----------------Dollars ($-------- ),
together with interest thereon in the sum of--------------------Dollars
($---------- ), and for costs and disbursements of this action. Said motion
will be based on the complaint and answer in this action, heretofore filed herein,
and the affidavits of------------------- and----------------, true and
correct copies of which are hereunto attached.
Dated:Attorney for Plaintiff.
AFFIDAVIT OF MOVING PARTY

CIRCUIT COURT

MILWAUKEE COUNTY

STATE OF WISCONSIN

John Doe,

Plaintiff.
vs.
Richard Roe,
Defendant.

AFFIDAVIT

STATE OF WISCONSIN 1
Jss.
MILWAUKEE COUNTY
John Doe, being first duly sworn, on oath deposes and says:
1. That he is the plaintiff above named and makes this affidavit in support
of his motion for summary judgment, as provided in Sec. 270.635 of Wisconsin
Statutes 1935.
2. That the above entitled action is an original action in the above named
court against the defendant, Richard Roe; that said action is brought to recover
the sum of ------------------Dollars ($------------ ) which amount is
alleged to be due upon (here state the character of the action so as to make it
fall within the class of actions named in Sec. 270.635 of Wisconsin Statutes,
such as: an action to recover a debt or demand arising on a contract, express
or implied-other than for breach of promise to marry.)
3. That the facts and circumstances under which the cause of action alleged
in the complaint arose are as follows: (here set forth briefly the evidentiary
'5 BRYANT, PLEADING AND PRACTICE (1930) § 945.
Either the notice of motion or the order to show cause can be used in this
motion.
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facts establishing the existence of a cause of action, attacking the original of
any writings referred to, or stating that they will be presented to the court on
the hearing of the motion; such as: that on or about the 12th day of March,
1934, in the presence of John Smith, an employee of the plaintiff, and at the
latter's place of business, the defendant, Richard Roe, accepted from the plaintiff, the sum of three thousand dollars in United States currency; that at the
same time, the defendant executed and delivered his promissory note of which a
copy marked Exhibit "A" is appended to the complaint; that the said note
was made payable to the order of the plaintiff; that on the date when the note
became due and payable, the plaintiff sent John Smith his employee, to demand
payment of the note from the defendant; that the defendant refused payment;
and that the plaintiff was at all times heretofore and now is the owner and
holder of the note, no part of which has been paid).
4. That by reason of the facts aforesaid, the sum of
Dollars ($ --------) is now due and owning from the defendant to the
plaintiff, this affiant, together with interest thereon from the ---------------day of
, 19-....
5. That affiant verily believes that there is no defense to this action.
WHEREFORE, affiant prays that the answer of the defendant heretofore
filed herein be stricken out, and that judgment be ordered for the plaintiff and
against the defendant for the sum of ----------------, as aforesaid, and
the costs of this action and this motion.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this--------day of-19__,

A.D.

Notary Public-Milwaukee County, Wis.
(My commission expires:--------- )
AFFIDAVIT OF PERSON WHO HAS KNOWLEDGE
OF THE EVIDENTIARY FACTS
CIRCUIT COURT

MILWAUKEE COUNTY

John Doe,
Plaintiff.
vs.
Richard Roe,
Defendant.

STATE OF WISCONSIN

AFFIDAVIT

STATE OF WISCONSIN)
MILWAUKEE COUNTY

J

John Smith, being first duly sworn, on oath says that he is employed by
John Doe, the plaintiff in this action; that he has read the complaint in the
above entitled action and the attached affidavit of John Doe, and has personal
knowledge of all the facts and transactions therein referred to, and that all
of the statements contained in the complaint and in said affidavit are true; that
on or about the 12th day of March, 1934, he was present when the plaintiff gave
to the defendant, Richard Roe, the sum of Three Thousand Dollars in United
States currency, in return for which the defendant executed and delivered to
the plaintiff his promissory note, of which a copy marked Exhibit "A" is
appended to the complaint. Affiant further says that he personally presented the
promissory note, mentioned in said affidavit and in the complaint to the maker
of said note on the date when the same became payable and demanded payment
according to the tenor of the instrument, and that payment was refused, and
that the amount due thereon is as stated in the complaint.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this--------- day of --------

19_, A.D.

Notary Public-Milwaukee County, Wis.
(My commission expires:---------- )
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AFFIDAVIT IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

CIRCUIT COURT

John Doe,

Plaintiff.

MILWAUKEE COUNTY

STATE OF WISCONSIN

AFFIDAVIT IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION

VS.

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Richard Roe,
Defendant.
STATE OF WISCONSIN ]ss

MILWAUKEE COUNTY J
Richard Roe, being first duly sworn, on oath deposes and says: That he is
the defendant in the above entitled action; that he makes this affidavit for the
purpose of showing unto the court, facts sufficient to convince the court that
the defendant, in the above entitled matter, has a good, sufficient and meritorious
defense to the claim set up in the complaint; and for the further purpose of
showing unto the court that some of the facts stated in plaintiff's affidavit and
the affidavit of--------------------, are erroneous and false.
(Here state evidentiary facts showing that the defendant has a meritorious
defense such as: Your affiant further deposes and says, that neither on
the 12th day of March, 1934, nor at any other time has the defendant received Three Thousand Dollars or any other amount from the plaintiff; that
the defendant executed his promissory note to the plaintiff on the promise of
plaintiff that he would send the money therefor to defendant within two days
after the execution of the note; that the defendant has never received any
money, as aforesaid from the plaintiff; that plaintiff on or about the 13th day
of March, 1934, called the defendant by telephone and told him that he (the
plaintiff) could not get the money and that he would tear up defendants note;
that the note was, therefore, given without consideration and plaintiff is not a
holder in due course.)
WHEREFORE, affiant believes that the defendant has a good, sufficient and
meritorious defense to the claim set up by the plaintiff in his complaint and
prays that plaintiff's motion for summary judgment be dismissed and that plaintiff pay the costs of this motion.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this
this-------- day of-------- , 19_., A.D.
Notary Public-Milwaukee County, Wis.
(My commission expires: ----------- )
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

CIRCUIT COURT

MILWAUKEE COUNTY

STATE OF WISCONSIN

John Doe,
Plaintiff.
vs.
Richard Roe,
Defendant.

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT3

The above entitled action having this day come on regularly to be heard
upon motion of ----------------, attorney for plaintiff, to strike out the
answer of the defendant and for summary judgment for the plaintiff; and
---appearing
for ---------------------in support of
said motion, and ------------------- appearing for .............
in opposition to said motion (recite other matter considered) :
IT IS ORDERED THAT the motion of the plaintiff for summary judgment pursuant to Supreme Court Rule, Sec. 270.635, be, and the same hereby
3 5 BRYANT, WISCONSIN PLEADING AND PaACrcE (1930) § 945.
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is, granted; that defendant's answer be, and the same hereby is, stricken
out; and that judgment be entered for the plaintiff against the defendant for
---------- Dollars, and interest thereon from----------------19..., and costs of this action and Ten Dollars ($10.00) costs of motion.
Dated:............................
By the court:---------------------Circuit Judge.
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

CIRCUIT COURT

MILWAUKEE COUNTY

STATE OF WISCONSIN

John Doe,
Plaintiff.
VS.

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Richard Roe,
Defendant.
The above entitled action having this day come on regularly to be heard
, attorney for plaintiff, to strike out
upon motion of--------------------the answer of the defendant and for summary judgment for the plaintiff; and
in opposition thereto;
------------------- appearing for----------------and the court having heard the arguments of counsel and having read and considered the affidavits of----------------------- and
in support of said motion, and the affidavit of------------------- in opposition to the motion, and the court being fully advised,
IT IS ORDERED THAT the motion of the plaintiff to strike the answer
and for judgment against the defendant, Richard Roe, pursuant to Sec. 270.635,
Wisconsin Statutes, 1935, be denied; and that the defendant, Richard Roe, have
of the plaintiff, Ten Dollars ($10.00) costs of this motion.
Dated:............................
By the court
Circuit Judge.
JUDGMENT

CIRCUIT COURT

MILWAUKEE COUNTY

STATE OF WISCONSIN

John Doe,

Plaintiff.
vs.
Richard Roe,
Defendant.

JUDGMENT4

The motion of the plaintiff in the above entitled action to have stricken out
the answer of the defendant and for summary judgment for the plaintiff and
against the defendant, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule, Sec. 270.635, having
been duly heard and considered, and said motion having been granted by the
court and entry of the judgment directed accordingly, now, on motion of
-------- , attorney for the plaintiff;
IT IS ADJUDGED, that the plaintiff, John Doe, (here state the relief
granted, such as: do have and recover of the defendant, Richard Roe, the sum
of ----------------Dollars ($---------- ), together with interest in
Dollars ($---------- ), making in all the
the sum of----------------sum of---------------------Dollars ($-------- ), and costs of this
action, including motion costs, hereby taxed in the sum of
Dollars ($-------- ).
By the court
Circuit Judge.
----------------- (Date)
45 BRYANT, PLEADING AND PRACTICE (1930)

§ 945.
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